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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant obtained a Summary Judgment against 
defendant Ila R. Painter and no appeal was taken there-
from; her husband, intervener Fred L. Painter, sought 
in this proceeding to obtain a release of a Garnishment 
served upon garnishee. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent made a motion to dismiss the Garnish-
ment issued and served upon the Nephi, Utah, branch of 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and for other 
appropriate relief. The court ordered the Garnishment 
released and discharged and awarded respondent judg-
ment against appellant for interest at the legal rate of 
six percent (6%) per annum on the sum of $723.79 from 
February 3, 1964, to the date of the Judgment, amount-
ing to the sum of $157.38, and attorney's fees in the sum 
of $250.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment of the 
lower court which released and discharged the Garnish-
ment, and an order awarding appellant garnishee judg-
ment for the entire joint bank account held by garnishee 
in the names of defendant Ila R. Painter and her hus-
band, Fred L. Painter, intervener-respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about March 8, 1961, defendants Deon Ros-
quist, Geraldine Rosquist and Ila R. Painter entered into 
a property improvement contract with Carpets, Inc., for 
the sale of certain carpeting, paddings and other floor 
coverings for the agreed consideration of $887.40, pay-
able in monthly installments of $24.65 each commencing 
on the 21st day of April, 1961, and continuing on the 21st 
day of each and every month thereafter until the entire 
balance was paid in full. ( R. 29) The eon tract was sold 
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and assigned to appellant on March 8, 1961. (R. 30) The 
above named defendants made eight partial payments 
on said contract, which, after deduction of late charges, 
left an unpaid balance of $703.73. 
On June 5, 1962, appellant commenced an action 
against defendants Deon Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist 
and Carpets, Inc., by filing a Complaint. (R. 1-3) Those 
defendants were personally served with a Summons, but 
did not answer. (R. 4-6) A Default Judgment was ob-
tained against defendants Deon Rosquist and Geraldine 
Rosquist on July 5, 1962, for the sum of $741.02, plus 
attorney's fees in the sum of $234.27, together with in-
terest thereon at the rate of eight percent (8%) per an-
num until paid. (R. 8) An Amended Complaint was filed 
on December 31, 1962, to include defendant, Ila R. Paint-
er. ( R. 19-22) Def eudant Ila R. Painter was personally 
served with a Summons on January 2, 1963 (R. 22-23) 
Defendant Ila R. Painter filed an Answer to said Amend-
ed Complaint on January 23, 1963. (R. 24) Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Ila R. Painter and Notice 
was filed on July 5, 1963. (R. 31-32) A Summary Judg-
ment Against Defendant Ila R. Painter was entered on 
July 29, 1963, for $741.02, plus attorney's fees in the 
sum of $234.27 and costs of $15.20, making an aggregate 
total of $990.49, together with interest thereon at the 
rate of eight percent ( 8%) per annum until paid. 
(R. 33-34) 
A Garnishment was issued naming defendants Deon 
Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist and Ila R. Painter and 
served on the Nephi, Utah, branch of First Security Bank 
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of Utah, N.A., on February 3, 1964. (R. 35) First Secur-
ity Bank of Utah, N.A., answered the Garnishment stat-
ing that they had a joint deposit account in the names of 
Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter with a balance of 
$723.79 at the time of service of the Garnishment. (R. 36) 
A Motion for Entry of Garnishee Judgment and Notice 
was filed by appellant on April 9, 1964. (R. 37) The 
lower court heard the motion on August 7, 1964, and 
failed to enter a Garnishee Judgment but charged First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. with a continuing obliga-
tion to appellant in the sum of $723.79. Defendant Ila 
R. Painter died on February 12, 1966. 
A Motion for Leave to Intervene and Motion to 
Dismiss Garnishment was filed by Intervener on 
August 29, 1967. (R. 40-41) An Order Granting Leave 
to Intervene in Garnishment Proceedings and Fix-
ing Time for Hearing Motion to Dismiss Garnish-
ment was granted on September 15, 1967 (R. 39) A 
Memorandum Decision was entered by the lower court 
on September 15, 1967. (R. 45) The lower court en-
tered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Mo-
tion of Intervener for Judgment in Garnishment Pro-
ceedings on September 19, 1967. ( R. 57 -59) A J udg-
ment in Garnishment Proceedings releasing and dis-
charging the Garnishment was signed on September 19, 
1967. (R. 50-51) Appellant filed a Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Submitted by 
Intervener on September 5, 1967. (R. 46-49) Intervener's 
Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings and 
Conclusions was filed on October 10, 1967. (R. 54-55) The 
lower court on October 16, 1967, entered an Order Deny-
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ing Motion to Amend Findings of Fact andConclusions 
of Law. (R. 56) A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 
19, 1967. (R. 66-67) 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RE-
LEASING AND DISCHARGING THE 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ISSUED AND 
SERVED UPON GARNISHEE. 
1. A Joint Bank Account Held by Garnishee in 
the Names of Defenda.nt Ila R. Painter and 
Respondent Is Subject to Garnishment by 
Appellant as Judgment Creditor of Defend-
a;nt Ila R. Painter. 
Rule 64 D(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ex-
pressly allows a plaintiff the supplementary remedy of 
garnishment. Rule 64 D (a) states as follows: 
"The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of the 
complaint, may have a writ of garnishment issue, 
and attach the credits, effects, debts, choses in 
action, money, and other personal property of the 
defendant in the possession or in the control of 
any third person, as garnishee, whether the same 
are due at the time of the service of the writ or 
are to become due thereafter under the same cir-
cumstances and by filing with the court in which 
the action is pending an affidavit as required by 
subdivision (a) of Rule 64C, relating to Attach-
ments; provided, that in addition to the require-
ments of the affidavit for a writ of attachment the 
affidavit for a writ of garnishment shall state that 
plaintiff has a good reason to believe and does 
believe that a particular person, firm or corpora-
tion, private or public, has property, money, 
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goods, chattels, credits or effects in his or its 
hands or under hi:-; or its control belo11ging to the 
defendant, or that such person, firm or corpora-
tion is indebtPd to the dcfrndaut." 
Rule 64 D(b) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
states that after entry of judgment the clerk may issue 
a writ of garnishment without the necessity of an affidavit 
as a condition precedent thereof. Rule 64D(b) (2), in 
part, states as follows: 
''After the entry of judgment, the clerk of any 
court from which execution thereon may be issued 
shall, upon request of the judgment creditor, issue 
a writ of garnishment and no affidavit or under-
taking shall be necessary as a condition therefor." 
The inadequacy in many cases of the ordinary means 
of enforcing a money judgment has led to the very im-
portant supplementary remedy of garnishment after 
judgment. The purpose of the supplementary remedy 
of garnishment after judgment is well statecl in 30 AM. 
JuR.2d Executions ~ 776 (EJG7), as follows: 
"The object of supplementary proceedings is not 
to obtain a new judgment for a debt, but to enable 
the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment he 
has already obtained. Tht>y are designed to pro-
vide a useful, efficacious, and salutary remedy at 
law, and to afford to a judgment creditor the 
most complete relief possible in satisfying his 
judgment. A purpose of the proceedings is to 
ascertain whether the judgment debtor owns 
property whieh can be applied in satisfaction of 
the judgment. Sueh proee0dings are particularly 
designed to reach and apply to the satisfaction of 
the judgment, property of tlw judgment debtor 
which is conceal0d, or whieh is in the hands of a 
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third person and which cannot be reached by the 
ordinary execution.'' 
The garnishment issued and served in these proceed-
ings wa8 in no way wrongful. Appellant was in good 
faith attempting to ascertain the true and specific inter-
est of defendant Ila R. Painter in any property held by 
garnishee. 
It seems well settled that a joint bank account is sub-
ject to garnishment by a judgment creditor of only one 
of the joint depositors. 30 AM. J uR.2d Executions § 800 
(1967), states as follows: 
'' .:\fost courts are agreed that a joint bank account 
is garnishable by a judgment creditor of only one 
of the joint depositors. In this respect, it has been 
held if, under the terms of the deposit agreement, 
a check for the amount of the judgment signed by 
the judgment debtor alone ·would have been hon-
ored, garnishment is available against the joint 
bank account.'' 
This court has faced the question of whether a credi-
tor can reach a joint bank account held in the names of 
the debtor and another person and has determined that 
the joint bank account can be reached by the creditor. 
Neill Y. Royce, 101Utah181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941). 
In recognizing that both parties to a joint bank ac-
count would attempt to defeat a judgment creditor's 
rights, the following statement was made in a Note, 
Joiut Bauk Accounts in Utah, 8 UTAH L. REv. 57, 65 
(1962): 
'' T11ere is no question that a creditor can reach 
as8ets of a debtor held by him in a joint account. 
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Because both parties to an account would have a 
common desire to defeat or minimize the credi-
tor's access to the funds, their version of the 
present inter vivos interest is likely to contradict 
his. Thus, a creditor may have difficulty proving 
that the debtor was the sole contributor, the 
amount of his contribution, or whether he was a 
codepositor who had actually been given a present 
interest or a depositor with only a convenience 
object in view." 
There are other authorities which recognize the 
right of a creditor to reach a joint bank account. 11 
A.L.R. 3rd, 1465, Joint Bank Account as Subject to At-
tachment, Garnishment, or Execution by Creditor of one 
of the Joint Depositors at page 1468 (1967), states as 
follows: 
"In any event, most courts are agreed that a 
joint bank account is garnishable at the behest 
of a creditor of one of the depositors. There are, 
however, a few cases holding for various reasons, 
that a joint bank account is not so garnishable, 
principally in jurisdictions that recognize tenan-
cies by the entirety in personal property and con-
sider that one was created as to the account 
sought to be garnished.'' 
United States v. Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. 
Supp. (M.D. Pa. -1953); Tinsley v. Bauer, 126 Cal.App.2d 
724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954); Leaf v. McGowan, 13 Ill. App. 
2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957); Neill v. Royce, supra; Park 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 
194 (1951), and mauy other cases hold that a joint bank 
account may be seized under an attachment or execution 
by a creditor of one of the joint depositors. 
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The Utah cases make it clear that where a joint bank 
account is created, there is a strong presumption that the 
joint account is valid and will be treated according to 
the terms of the signature card signed by the parties. 
The case of Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 
P.2d 179 (1961), involved a controversy over two joint 
savings accounts in which the decedent, the original 
owner of the funds, added the defendant's name to the 
account ten months prior to his death. The plaintiff, as 
executor of the estate of the decedent, brought an action 
to recover the funds. The lower court ruled summarily 
before trial that the defendant was entitled to the funds. 
This Court reversed the lower court and stated as 
follows: 
"Notwithstanding what may have been said 
therein, we are of the opinion that the rule which 
is sound in principle and practical in application 
is that applied in the cases of Neill v. Royce and 
Greener v. Greener, supra: that where there is a 
written agreement of joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship, there is a presumption of validity 
and it will be given effect unless it is successfully 
attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other 
infirmity, or unless it is shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the parties intended other-
wise; and further, that such rule is applicable 
whether the parties are living or where death has 
intervened. Nor would the fact that the original 
owner may have changed his mind after the crea-
tion of the account alter the applicability of that 
rule.'' Tattigren v. Ingalls, supra, 12 Utah 2d at 
394, 367 P .2d at 184. 
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The case of Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P.2c1 
836 (1966), emphasizes the presumption of validity given 
to a joint bank account. In that case, the plaintiffs, as 
grandchildren and heirs of the decedent, commenced an 
action claiming a share of six bank accountf; held in joint 
tenancy by their grandmother and her two daughters, the 
defendants in the case. The joint bank accounts were 
created several years prior to the decedent's death and 
were of the type commonly used, whereby either party 
could withdraw the funds and providing for the right of 
survivorship. All of the funds had been deposited by the 
decedent. Shortly before the decedent's death, the de-
fendants withdrew the funds which they divided between 
them. 
The plaintiffs in that case argued that the decedent 
did not intend to give the defendants ownership in the 
funds nor to create a true joint tenancy ·with right of 
survivorship. The defendants moved for a dismissal of 
the action which was granted. On appeal to this Court it 
was stated as follo-ws : 
"""We are thus brought to a consideration of the 
principal difficulty - confronting the plaintiffs: 
They are trying to defeat the effect of a written 
instrument. It is endowed with a presumption of 
validity. Its provisions, inclucling the recited facts 
of joint tenancy with right of survivorship, must 
be given effect unless it is successfully attacked on 
some proper ground; and it can only be over-
come by clear and convincing evidence.'' Han ks 
v. Hales, supra, 17 Utah 2<1at346, 411 P.2d at 837. 
These cases, when applied to the case at har, make 
it patently clear that appellant is Pntitled to a garnishee 
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judgment against the joint bank account at the Nephi, 
Utah, branch of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., held 
in the names of defendant Ila R. Painter and respond-
ent. 'I1he cited cases make it clear that the presumption 
of joint tenancy can be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing proof to the contrary. Respondent has not in-
troduced a scintilla of competent evidence to overcome 
this presmption. That respondent filed an affidavit in 
the lower court claiming that the funds deposited in the 
joint checking account were his sole property does not in 
the least overcome the presumption that a valid joint 
account was created and that respondent did in fact in-
tend to create a valid legal interest in his wife, defend-
ant Ila R. Painter. Said affidavit is not proper evidence 
and for the reason that appellant was given no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine respondent. The joint bank 
account in question must be treated as what it truly is -
a joint account in which either party at any time could 
withdraw all of the funds and a joint account in which a 
creditor of either should be subrogated to those rights. 
In a Comment, 60 MICH. L. REv., 972, 982-83 (1962), 
the following comments were made concerning the pre-
sumptions involved in a creditor situation: 
"As long as the intervivos disputes are between 
the donor and donee themselves, those courts 
which employ ·weak presumptions in these cases 
treat the joint account form as having a relatively 
minor significance in determining the parties' in-
terests. The donee has little equity in his favor, 
having given no consideration for the interest he 
now claims and basing his clemand solely on the 
largesse of the donor. In these circumstances, the 
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donor is granted a great deal of leeway in chal-
lenging and def eating the do nee 's claims. 
''When creditors enter the picture, however, 
these same courts are less willing to allow the 
donor to disaffirm the donee 's interests to the det-
riment of creditors who may not know of any par-
ticular relationships or agreements between the 
co-depositors and who may have extended credit 
on the faith of the donee 's apparent interest in 
the account. 
''Thus, courts that would ordinarily deny to the 
donee any presumption of an intervivos interest 
or would invoke only a weak presumption do just 
the opposite in creditor situations. The donee is 
presumed to have a joint interest in the account 
and the burden of proof is placed upon the party 
contesting the donee 's interest. 
''Those courts which invoke a strong intervivos 
presumption for the donee in the first instance 
need not change their presumption to accomplish 
the same result. The creditor, in both weak and 
strong presumption jurisdictions, can thus rely 
on the form of the account to raise a presumption 
that the donee does have an interest that is sub-
ject to attachment and the co-depositors must 
sustain the burden of proving the donor's con-
trary intent in order to rebut the presumption." 
In 1961 the Savings & Loan Act enacted a statute 
which makes tlie terms of a joint account in a savings and 
loan association conclusive in the absence of fraud or 
undue influence. Section 7-13-39, Utah Code Annotated 
(Supp. 1967). 
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Section 7-3-45, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1967), 
was amended in 1965 to add a paragraph which, in part, 
states as follows: 
"A bank shall not be required to pay out all or 
any part of the credit balance in any such joint 
account pursuant to an attachment, execution, 
garnishment, judgment, or other legal process 
issued in any action or proceeding against any 
one or more but less than all of the persons to 
whom the account is payable until the bank has 
been furnished a certified copy of an order of a 
court of competent jurisdiction determining that 
such person or persons owned a specified part or 
all of such credit balance at the time such process 
was served on the bank.'' 
The only logical construction which can be given to 
the statute is that prior to the enactment of said statute 
a bank could pay out the balance of a joint bank account 
pursuant to an attachment, execution, garnishment, judg-
ment or other legal process issued in any action or pro-
ceeding against any one or more but less than all of the 
persons to whom the account is payable without being 
furnished a certified copy of an order of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction determining that such person or per-
sons owned a specified part or all of such credit balance 
at the time such process was served on the bank. 
The Garnishment in the case at hand was issued and 
serYed prior to the enactment of the statute. As a prac-
tical matter no bank would pay out all or any part of the 
credit balance in a joint account pursuant to a garnish-
ment without a court order, but not until the enactment 
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of this statute was mention made of portions owned by 
the parties. 
It is of interest that Section 7-3-45, Utah Code An-
notated (Supp. 1967), specifically recognizes that a joint 
bank account is subject to garnishment. 
A creditor's right to garnishee a joint bank account 
for the debt of one of the depositors ceases upon the 
death of the depositor. Deforge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 
76 N.W. 2d 733 (1956); Weaver v. Pickard, 7 Utah 299, 
26 Pac. 581 (1891). However, in the case at bar, the 
Judgment against Mrs. Painter was obtained prior to her 
death and the Garnishment was issued and served prior 
to her death. 
2. Appellant Should Be Allowed a Garnishee 
Judgment on the Entire Joint Bank Ac-
count Held in the Names of Defendant Ila 
R. Painter and Respondent. 
Since by the terms of the joint bank account agree-
ment both defendant Ila R. Painter and respondent are 
given the unconditional power to withdraw all of the 
funds from the joint bank account at any time, appel-
lant should be subrogated to the right of defendant Ila 
R. Painter and therefore be allowed a garnishee judg-
ment on .the entire sum of the joint bank account. Any 
different rule would defraud creditors. The parties to a 
joint bank account should not be allowed to come in after 
a judgment has been obtained against one of the parties 
and contradict the terms of the very agreement which 
they voluntarily signed. 
14 
In Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, supra, the plain-
tiff ::med the clef endant to enforce payment of rent under 
an oral lease between the parties. The plaintiff in an-
cillary proceedings garnisheed a joint bank account 
standing in the 11ame of the defendant and his wife and 
the wife intervened in the case. The lower court deter-
mined that it was impossible to determine on an eviden-
tiary basis the exact amount of funds each had contrib-
uted to the account. The lower court concluded that the 
defendant and his wife should be presumed equal owners 
and ordered judgment against the garnishee for the 
amount of the default judgment obtained against the de-
fendant in the main action, but not to exceed one-half 
of the joint account. The plaintiff appealed and the Min-
nesota Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"By the deposit agreement here involved, each 
depositor has given the other depositor in the ac-
count complete and absolute authority over it and 
unconditional power to withdraw all or any part 
of the account. By the terms of the agreement, 
the bank is likewise obliged to pay any part or all 
of the account to either depositor upon demand. 
''Since in purpose and legal effect a garnishment 
proceeding is virtually an action brought by de-
fendant in plaintiff's name against the garnishee, 
resulting in the subrogation of the plaintiff to the 
right of the defendant against the garnishee, we 
have concluded that plaintiff here may not only 
garnishee this joint account, but also that it would 
be entitled to recover judgment against the gar-
nishee for the entire amount of the account if its 
judgment against defendant were sufficient to ex-
hau~t it. Defendant is entitled to withdraw a!fly 
vart or all of the account, nnd plaintiff, in effect, is 
subrogated to that right." (Emphasis added) Park 
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Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, supra, 233 Minn. at 
469, 47 N.W. 2d at 196. 
The reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court is 
sound. The defendant could have voluntarily paid any-
one, even his creditors, all of the funds in the joint ac-
count, and thus an involuntary payment should not be 
treated inconsistently with those voluntary rights. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court further stated as follows: 
"Intervener, haYing agreed to allow defendant to 
treat the funds in their joint account as his indi-
vidual property, is in no position to assert that 
creditors, subrogated to his rights, may not treat 
them as if they were his individual property. In-
tervener assumed the risk that defendant would 
pay these creditors voluntarily, and we fail to see 
why an involuntary payment stands upon a dif-
ferent footing. If Intervener assumed the risk 
that her husband would voluntarily honor his 
debts out of this account, we see no meritorious 
reason why she should be legally entitled to es-
chew the risk that he will be compelled to do so. 
The law should not hedge intervener's risk at the 
exact instant when the degree of her risk rests 
upon a point of honor. We shall not assume that 
intervener took the risk that her husband would 
honor his debts out of this account merely be-
cause she thought he could not be compelled to do 
so." Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, supra, 233 
Minn. at 469, 47 N.W. 2d at 196-97. 
This Court should not encourage resp011dent to do 
his boo~eeping in court when by his very contract 
with First Security Bank of Utah,N.A. he has virtually 
declared that he does not want to be inconvenienced by 
any strict accountability as Letween himself and his wif t>, 
defendant Ila R. Painter. 
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rrhe 1\finnesota Supreme Court pointed out the fatal 
effect of allowing a party to the joint accow1t, such as 
respondent in the case at bar, to come into court and 
claim that the account is his and exempt from garnish-
ment. 
''Any presumption, whether conclusive or rebut-
tahle, that part or all of these joint accounts are 
immune from garnishment has the effect of either 
creating or tending to create a nonstatutory ex-
emption for the parties using them, and any at-
tempt to base the extent of garnishment upon 
the respectirn amounts of the account owned by 
each depositor will compel courts and juries to 
grope with problems which the depositors them-
selves have declared to be of no consequence. Let 
them abide the results which flow from their own 
declared purposes. Park Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Track, supra, 233 Minn. at 470, 47 N.W. 2d at 197. 
This same reasoning was applied in Empire Fer-
tilizers, Ltd. v. Cioci, 4 D.L.R. 804 (1934), where the Ca-
nadian court stated as follows: 
"If the judgment debtor, B. N. Cioci, had given 
to the judgment creditor a cheque signed by B. N. 
Cioci alone on the Royal Bank, Jane and Annette 
Branch, Toronto, for the amount owing by Cioci 
on the judgment, the bank, on presentment of 
such cheque for payment, would have had to pay 
it, on the penalty of an action for damages by 
B. N. Cioci, against the bank if such cheque had 
been dishonoured. I see no reason why this judg-
ment creditor of B. N. Cioci should not have re-
course to these proceedings to compel such ap-
propriation of these funds as was within the pow-
er of Cioci himself at the time of the issue and 
servwe of the garnishee summons on the 
bank .... '' 
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Empire Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Cioci, supra, 4 D.L.R. 
at 805. 
Either defendant Ila R. Painter or respondent could 
at any time withdraw all or any part of the funds in the 
joint bank account and each had unconditional power to 
utilize moneys in the account. See also section 7-3-45, 
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1967), which states as 
follows: 
"When a deposit has been made in any bank in 
the names of two or more persons, payable to any 
one of such persons or the survivor of them, such 
deposit or any part thereof or any interest or 
dividend thereon may be paid to any one of such 
persons, whether the other or others be living or 
not, and the receipt or acquittance of the person 
so paid shall be a valid and sufficient release and 
discharge to the bank for any payment so made.'' 
Inasmuch as either defendant Ila R. Painter or re-
spondent could have withdrawn the entire amount of the 
joint checking account, the only logical conclusion is that 
appellant should be subrogated to the rights of defend-
ant Ila R. Painter, and allowed a garnishee judgment for 
the entire account. 
The case of Neill v. Royce, s11pra, stands for the 
premise that joint bank accounts may be reached by a 
creditor. of one of the joint owners. In that case a di-
vorced wife, in an attempt to obtain unpaid support 
money from the defendant, obtained a reestraining order 
against the defendant, restraining him from disposing 
of his assets. A copy of the restraining order was served 
upon a bank where the defendant and his second 'vife 
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had a joint savings account. rrhe second wife intervened 
in the action and testified that the funds in the bank 
account were her separate property, left to her by her 
deceased first husband and intended for the education 
of her children by the first marriage. 
This Court discussed the status of a creditor's claim 
on a joint bank account as follows: 
''In the instant case, however, we do not have a 
suit between a codepositor and the representa-
tives of the deceased codepositor. We have a suit 
by a third party against the interest of one of the 
living codepositors. This court having made the 
written instrument conclusive evidence in the 
case of the deceased codepositor, Holt v. Bayles, 
supra, the question arises what presumption will 
the law purport to a joint tenancy agreement 
where both parties to the written agreement are 
still alive.'' Neill v. Royce, supra, 101 Utah at 
185, 120 P.2d at 329. 
This Court further discussed the presumption: 
''This court does not agree with counsel for the 
respondent that Holt v. Bayles, supra, and the 
conclusive principle therein laid down that 'inten-
tion ceases to be an issue and the courts are bound 
by the agreement' as being controlling under the 
circumstanees of the instant case; nevertheless, 
there remains a presumption of joint tenenacy 
where both cotenants are alive. * * * This pre-
sumption, in,jr,cted by courts of equity since an-
cient time, continues and ca1Jz be overcome by the 
intrn"enfr only by clear and convincing proof to 
t71 e contrary." (Emphasis added) Neill v. Royce, 
supra, 101 Utah at 188, 120 P.2d at 330-331. 
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In discussing the evidence introduced and clearly stating 
that the evidence was not sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption, this Court stated as follows : 
"The only evidence refuting the implied joint sav-
ings account in the instant case was that of the 
testimony of the codepositors to the effect that 
their purpose in establishing the joint savings 
account was to take advantage of the survivor-
ship provision, and that the money was intended 
to be the sole and separate property of the inter-
vener. Such proof under the circumstances of this 
case cannot be termed so clear and convincing as 
to require the trial court to find in favor of the 
appellant. To say that it was sufficient woulrl 
throw open the door to fraud and collusion as be-
tween codepositors and third parties. This equity 
will not do." (Emphasis added) Neill v. Royce, 
supra, 101 Utah at 189, 120 P.2d at 331. 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REACH-
ING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW. 
1. Findings of Fact Numbered 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 
Are Not Supported by the Evidence. 
Finding of Fact No. 1 is not supported by the evi-
dence. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
appellant caused to be served upon First Security Bank 
of Utah N.A. a Writ of Garnishment directed against 
property of Carpets, Inc. 
Finding of Fact No. 2 does not set forth the com-
plete answers of the garnishee, First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. to the interrogatories of the Garnishment 
served upon it by appellant. That finding deletes that 
portion of the answer which states as follows: 
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''On February 7, 1964, he presented a check drawn 
by him against said joint account for withdrawal 
of the full amount remaining in said account and 
demanded payment of said amount to him. In the 
absence of proof or knowledge to the contrary we 
assume that the statement and claim of Fred L. 
Painter are correct.'' 
The fact that respondent presented a check to the 
Nephi, Utah, branch of First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., and withdrew the funds in the joint account, is 
material as to the length of time respondent was without 
use of the funds and should be made a part of said 
finding. 
Finding of Fact No. 6 should be amended to delete 
that portion of the finding which states "that no answer 
or counter-affidavit was filed by the plaintiff or by the 
garnishee.'' Said portion of the finding is irrelevant and 
immaterial to the issues at hand. 
Finding of Fact No. 7 should be amended to delete 
the portion of the finding which states "that the funds 
deposited in said joint bank account were at the time of 
deposit the sole property of said intervener and not the 
property of his wife, Ila R. Painter; that said intervener 
was at the time of service of said writ of garnishment on 
said garuishee the true owner of said joint account. ... '' 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, 
states as follows: 
''In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
... the court shall, unless the same are waived, 
find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of 
the appropriate judgment .... " 
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It is a well-accepted rule that written findings of 
fact a11d conclusions of law must be separately stated. 
However, the portion of Finding of Fact No. 7 quoted 
above is not supported by any evidence and if it were 
supported by the evidence would be a conclusion of law. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate 
that Mr. Painter was the true owner of the joint bank 
account either at the time said deposit was made or at 
the time of service of the Garnishment. 
Finding of Fact No. 7 should be further amended 
to delete that portion of said finding which states "that 
by reason of service of said writ of garnishment said 
intervener has been continuously deprived of funds con-
stituting said joint account." That portion of the find-
ing is controverted by the Answer to Interrogatories on 
Garnishment filed by the garnishee, wherein it was stated 
respondent presented a check to garuiRhee on February 
7, 1964, for withdrawal of the full amount remaining in 
said joint bank account. 
Finding of Fact No. 8 should be amended to delete 
that portion of the finding which states that "such de-
mands have been wrongfully refused .... '' Said finding is 
a conclusion of law and is not supported by the evidence 
in the record. 
2. Conclusions of Law Are Not Supported uy the 
Evidence. 
The Conclusions of Law reacheJ by the lower court 
state, in part, as follows: 
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''From the foregoing facts the court concludes 
that the intervener, Fred L. Painter, is now and 
at all times herein mentioned \Vas the owner and 
entitled to the use of the funds on deposit in said 
joint bank account at the First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. in the sum of $723.79 .... " 
There is absolutely no competent evidence that re-
spondent is or at any time was the sole owner of the 
joint bank account. Even if respondent was at one time 
the owner of said funds, this is immaterial because of 
the rights vested in defendant Ila R. Painter under the 
terms of the joint bank account. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court 
erred in releasing and discharging the joint bank ac-
count and in awarding judgment to respondent and 
against appellant for interest and attorney's fees and 
the judgment should be reversed. Appellant further sub-
mits that it should be awarded a garnishee judgment on 
the total of the joint bank account because to hold other-
wise would act as a fraud upon creditors and in direct 
contradiction to the terms of the joint bank account 
agreement signed by defendant Ila R. Painter and 
respondent. 
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